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Abstract 
 
The tax-payer-as-gambler (TAG) model of tax non-compliance is the classic vehicle 
for providing some simple insights.  Under fairly general conditions this model 
supports the following four propositions: (1) if the rate of return to evasion is positive 
everyone evades tax; (2) people with higher risk-aversion tend to evade less; (3) 
people with higher personal income tend to evade more; (4) increasing any of the 
standard tax-enforcement parameters (the probability of audit, the proportional 
surcharge on evaded tax and the tax rate) will reduce the amount of concealed 
income.  Not all of these TAG model predictions seem intuitively reasonable, nor are 
they all borne out by empirical evidence. 
 
There are three principal intellectual routes for a more satisfactory approach: 
 
• A re-examination of the underlying model of taxpayer motivation. This 
encompasses relaxation of the expected-utility assumption, introduction of 
time into the modeling framework and an extension of the range of arguments 
of the utility function. 
• A revision of the model of interaction between the taxpayer and the tax 
authority. This allows the introduction of an explicit strategic interaction 
encapsulated in the auditing relationship. Neither the models with 
precommitment or those without precommitment fully capture the relevant 
features of the noncompliance problem.  Both neglect the problem of “ghosts”. 
• The role of the modeling of firms. This route is relatively neglected in the 
theoretical and empirical literature. An elementary treatment of the problem 
suggests that it has potential as an exploratory tool and as a guide to policy 
makers. 
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1 Introduction
This paper is about the role of economic analysis in understanding the tax-
compliance problem. The title “sticks and carrots” suggests a recalcitrant beast
to be beaten into unwilling compliance or to be seduced into cooperation by
an elusive dangling incentive. However, the story is somewhat richer than that.
The discussion will show that economic theory can play an important part in
explaining the underlying mechanisms relating to the economic engagement of
the citizen as taxpayer in the funding of public programmes and why this may
be an endemic problem for tax administration. It will also show what the
natural limitations of the stick-and-carrot analogy may be and what alternative
paradigms of compliance could usefully be employed.
The standard microeconomic approach to tax compliance helps us to under-
stand the basic schizophrenia that lies at the heart of public economics. This
has little to do with the like or dislike of government and little to do with the
approval or disapproval with the way in which the government raises funds or
the mix of goods and services that it provides. In order to be able to appreciate
how the standard approach can be useful in designing empirical investigations
into tax noncompliance and in formulating policy it is important to understand
what can reasonably be expected from economic models in this area and what
can be expected by way of evidence.
Models No overall modelling framework can be expected to oﬀer an all-
encompassing story of the compliance problem. However particular models can
be useful in providing particular economic insights that illuminate particular
aspects of the compliance problem and that can help a piecemeal appreciation
of diﬀerent parts of the tax-administration territory. Microeconomic models
have a further role in helping us to understand what may be the consequences
of the successful establishment of specific institutions or norms or, indeed, the
breakdown of these institutions and norms. Predictions in these models are
always conditional upon the appropriateness of the particular institutional set
that is assumed.
Evidence By definition evidence is bound to be limited and imperfect — a
claim to the contrary would make any sensible researcher suspicious. However,
data arising from the audit process or from activities that are collateral to
noncompliance activities can be expected to reveal information about subsets
of the compliance problem.
We begin by introducing the standard paradigm.
2 The TAG model
The Taxpayer As Gambler model1 is perhaps the benchmark economic ap-
proach of modelling tax-noncompliance. It is important to understand the
1The model was pioneered by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and is widely discussed in
the literature. For an introduction see, for example, Andreoni et al. (1998), section 3; Cowell
(1990), section 2.1; Franzoni (1999) section 3.1; Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) Chapter 4.
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ground rules of this type of approach — and thereby its limitations in help-
ing us to see the way in which oﬃcial incentives work on individual decisions to
conceal taxable income and, in some cases, to generate taxable income.
The model is based on the elementary choice facing an individual in an
atemporal environment. It is non-strategic in that no account is taken of possible
conditioning of taxpayer behaviour on beliefs about the tax-authority’s reaction
to its information signals, nor vice-versa. Government or tax-authority actions
may be conditioned on personal attributes, but there is not enough information
in the system to build in assumptions about best response.
2.1 Foundations
The taxpayer is confronted by a classic economic problem of choice under risk.
He or she knows the tax legislation, the taxes that are liable be paid and the
penalty for getting caught and convicted of failing to pay one’s taxes. The
taxpayer also knows that the tax authority is not psychic: the authority cannot
know the true liability to tax unless the person reports it or the authority spends
time and trouble finding out for itself. So the taxpayer could get away with
concealing part of his resources, falsifying the report made to the tax-authority,
or even making no report at all. Being without moral scruples he or she is
tempted to take the opportunity of evasion.
2.1.1 The individual
At the heart of the analysis there is an simple and familiar lottery: is it worth
the taxpayer’s taking a chance on being caught and suﬀering a financial penalty?
To focus on this problem assume that the taxpayer’s initial resources and all
gains and losses can be measured in terms of a single consumption good that
can be interpreted as “income”. We further simplify the discussion by making
two important assumptions about time and uncertainty.
1. Time is compressed into a single period within which the taxpayer has to
make a decision on whether to attempt to evade paying tax and, if so, how
much to evade.
2. Once the evasion decision has been taken, exactly one of two possible
states-of-the-world must occur: either the taxpayer is not audited and
enjoys a consumption level c0, or is audited and, if he has evaded tax, is
convicted and punished, in which case consumption is c00. If the taxpayer
chooses to act honestly then c00 = c0; otherwise c00 < c0.
The exact nature of the lottery will be determined by the person’s financial
resources, the tax system and the penalty system in force. The basic model
assumes that the tax system is based on income and has the following charac-
teristics:
Axiom 1 The person has a fixed gross income y which is liable to tax.
Axiom 2 There is a proportional income tax at rate t.
Axiom 3 (a) There is a fixed probability p of tax evasion being discovered and
punished. (b) The tax on any concealed income is subject to surcharge at a rate
s.
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Viewed this way noncompliance is just another risky activity with a known
distribution of returns. The rate of return r to a dollar of evaded tax takes
the value −s with probability p and the value 1 with probability 1− p. So the
expected rate of return is r¯ := 1− p − ps. If the person behaved honestly and
declared y disposable income would be [1 − t]y. Otherwise disposable income
depends on the amount of evasion: if an amount of income e is concealed (so
that the taxpayer reports an amount y − e) then consumption is given by the
random variable:
c = [1− t]y + ret (1)
Let us now analyse the taxpayer’s optimal evasion decision, given the above
budget constraint. We may expect the exact decision that the person makes will
depend on his or her personal attributes a that may include components such as
willingness to take risks, innate honesty and the like. However, it is conventional
to assume that all taxpayers of whatever a-type have the same general structure
to their preferences over the state-contingent consumption levels c0 and c00. The
standard assumption is:
Axiom 4 Each a-type taxpayer’s preferences is represented by an expected util-
ity function
[1− p]ua(c0) + pua(c00) (2)
where ua is an increasing, concave function.
What this means is that the utility derived from disposable income (con-
sumption) is increasing, but marginal utility increases at a decreasing rate. It
rules out the phenomenon of the risk-lover: everyone is assumed to be either
risk-averse (in which case the indiﬀerence curves are strictly convex to the ori-
gin) or risk-neutral. Furthermore the slope of any indiﬀerence curve in the
neighbourhood of perfectly honest behaviour2 is fixed at −[1−p]/p (the betting
odds on the person succeeding in his evasion), irrespective of income.
With c determined by the rate-of-return to evasion r and condition (1) it is
straightforward to write down the condition for maximising utility with respect
to concealed income e. If the taxpayer conceals some but not all of his income
then we must have
1− p
p
uac (c
0)
uac (c
00)
= s (3)
where uac (c
0), uac (c00) denote the a-type’s marginal utility in the two possible
cases (“not-caught”, “caught”) respectively. Condition (3) has the simple inter-
pretation “Marginal rate of substitution = proportional penalty”. In principle
we should also consider two special cases that modify this conclusion:
1. Where the person reports completely honestly; replace “=” by “≤” in (3).
2. Where the person completely specialises in evasion; replace “=” by “≥”
in (3).
Condition (3) can be used to derive optimal evasion e∗ as a function of the
tax-enforcement parameters (p, s, t) and the personal characteristics (y, a). The
properties of this function are are inherited directly from the assumptions about
the utility function and it can be used to derive a number of specific behavioural
predictions, discussed in section 2.2.1 below.
2This the point where c00 = c0, because e = 0.
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2.1.2 The aggregate
If the economy is large then the government may take as determinate the total
amount of revenue that it receives through the penalties imposed on proven tax
evaders, although the amount that each individual taxpayer has to pay (tax
plus surcharges) is random.
There are several ways in which the appropriate budgetary constraint upon
government might be modelled. The standard version is as follows. The gov-
ernment has a specific net revenue target R0 and it faces an aggregate resource
cost of enforcement that is increasing in the detection probability p. Actual
revenue raised R is given by total legal tax burden minus the total leakage
through evasion and the resource cost of enforcement. The constraint that the
government faces is simply R ≥ R0: tax receipts, net of any leakages to the
underground economy and administration costs, must be at least as great as
revenue. Given an appropriate objective function and a specification of the
resource-cost function this constraint can form the basis for the design of an op-
timal tax-enforcement policy. But, as we will see in section 6.1 below, uncritical
application of this apparently commonsense criterion in a normative model can
lead to unfortunate prescriptions.
2.2 Results
Let us briefly review what can be deduced immediately from the basic assump-
tions of the simple TAG model and the attempts to implement it empirically.
2.2.1 Theoretical overview
Although we have mentioned three possible outcomes of individual optimisation
(equation 3 and the two modifications that follow) only two are relevant. Given
that the person is an expected utility maximiser and that the marginal utility
of consumption is positive then case 1 drops out if r¯ > 0: the person will
always conceal some of his income.3 We can also see from the condition (3)
that increasing the probability of detection p or the surcharge s will shift the
equilibrium in such a way that e∗ is reduced.4
Furthermore, there is an intuitively reasonable result to be obtained that
characterises taxpayer behaviour across diﬀerent attribute classes of taxpayers.
An a-type’s risk aversion is defined to be the proportion rate at which the
3See Cowell (1990), page 56 for an explanation. However, this may not apply in richer
models of tax-payer choice. If for example, the person is in an intertemporable problem
and faces borrowing constraints, then he may evade even if the expected return is negative
(Andreoni 1992). Of course if the individuals’ preferences in the face of risk do not conform to
that of the expected-utility model (2) then taxpayers ,may comply more than the conventional
theory would suggest (Bernasconi 1998).
4To see this rewrite condition (3) as
uac ([1− t]y + et)
uac ([1− t]y − set)
=
ps
1− p
Check the left-hand side of this equation: remembering that uac (·) is everywhere decreasing
or constant we can see that an increase in e will decrease the numerator the and increase
the denominator; the LHS is decreasing in e. Now ncreasing p or s obviously increases the
right-hand side. So the only way the equation can still hold if p or s increases is if e falls.
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a-type’s marginal utility falls with consumption:
−u
a
cc(c)
uac (c)
. (4)
where uacc(c) is the slope of the marginal utility function (negative in the case
of risk aversion). If it is true that in attribute class 1 risk taxpayer risk aversion
is higher than in attribute class 2, for all values of c, then taxpayers in class 1
will always conceal more income than taxpayers in class 2.5
To obtain other results one further restriction on preferences is usually in-
troduced. This is expressed as:
Axiom 5 Absolute risk aversion (4) is a decreasing function of c.
This implies that a risk-averse individual who holds a mixed portfolio of a
safe asset and a risky asset would increase the holding of the risky asset were
the endowment to increase. So, for any particular a and any given set of tax-
enforcement parameters (p, s, t), if the person’s taxable income y increases then
so too does e, the absolute amount of income concealed. However decreasing
absolute risk aversion does not permit anything definite to be said about the
proportion of taxable income that is being concealed.
So, the elementary analysis of behaviour in the face of risk results in four
simple propositions about the incidence of tax-evasion in the community (see
the Appendix page 27):
1. if the rate of return to evasion is positive everyone evades tax;
2. people with higher risk-aversion tend to evade less;
3. people with higher personal income tend to evade more;
4. increasing any of the tax-enforcement parameters p, s, t will reduce the
amount of concealed income.
The TAG model is remarkably robust in that the above propositions are
established for a wide class of individual preferences. However, of these only
proposition 2 and two-thirds of proposition 4 seem to chime automatically with
common sense. It seems strange to assert that all taxpayers will evade; and
although the we would expect compliance to increase with the probability of
audit p and with the size of the surcharge s, why should it also increase with
the nominal tax rate t? Many would argue that common sense suggests the
opposite. As for proposition 3, who knows? Clearly this is an area where
“common sense” is not entirely adequate and we need empirical evidence.
2.2.2 Empirical model specification
The model gives aggregate evasion in the form (13) which suggests that an ap-
propriate econometric version of the model ought to have tax and enforcement
parameters, personal income and indicators of the type of income recipient as
5See Cowell (1990), pages 57,8
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explanatory variables; the dependent variable would be some measure of under-
reported income. The model could be estimated for diﬀerent categories of tax-
payer or for taxpayers in general. The empirical model could be used to test
the empirical validity some of the propositions on the shape of the e-function
that were raised in section 2.2.1.
However there are a number of diﬃculties with appropriately specifying an
empirical model. There may be underlying problems of sample-selection bias;
for example even a carefully conducted review of taxpayer audits may nonethe-
less exclude some individuals who do not file a tax return at all. Furthermore
a particularly tricky diﬃculty is the specification of the variable characterising
the probability of audit. Usually what has been done is to rely upon some proxy
for evasion opportunity (such as the presence of business income) to categorise
diﬀerent audit classes, and we can expect the probability of audit to diﬀer across
these classes.6 Finally there is a “rationing” problem: individuals’ opportuni-
ties for participating in evasion diﬀer greatly as between occupations and social
groups, although one might suppose that the membership of rationed and non-
rationed groups is largely self-selected. The appropriate margin of choice for
an individual may not be to change the amount of evasion activity undertaken
within the context of a particular group, but rather to migrate between groups
in response to changes in tax-enforcement parameters.
2.2.3 Taxpayer audits
Nevertheless the work that has been done on taxpayer audit data is interesting
and very informative. Historically the United States has provided the empir-
ical researcher a tremendous advantage — the Tax Compliance Measurement
Program (TCMP) is a pre-eminent data source unmatched by other countries’
tax systems.7 Here I briefly summarise some of the empirical work based on
taxpayer audit data, principally from the TCMP.8
• Tax compliance diﬀers according to income type and socioeconomic group.
For example it is lower for married people than single persons; lower for
younger people (are they less risk averse?).
• It is the source of income rather than its level which is a significant deter-
minant of evasion. A much higher proportion of wage and salary income is
reported than is the case for self-employment income. Personal taxpayers
have a rather low value of the income-elasticity of underreporting (about
0.3) compared with that for farm business income (about 0.65).
• Income level and enforcement parameters generally have the expected
eﬀects on evasion behaviour. Higher income is associated with higher
6See for example the approach in Andreoni et al. (1998).
7The last TCMP was done in 1988, although a limited version has been reintroduced as
the National Research Program in 2002.
8A bibiographic note. The results on taxpayer characteristics and income sources are
drawn from the studies by Beron et al. (1992), Clotfelter (1983) and Feinstein (1991). The
main references on the role of income and the impact of enforcement parameters are Beron
et al. (1992), Landsman et al. (2002), Poterba (1987) and Witte and Woodbury (1985),
For an authoritative account of the inherent econometric problems see Feinstein (1991). The
Minesotta audit experiment is reported in Slemrod et al. (2001).
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amounts of under-reported income. However although taxpayer compli-
ance is usually positively associated with the probability and severity of
criminal penalties the relationship is weak. This has been broadly con-
firmed by a recent Minnesota “audit experiment” where taxpayers were
informed that they were likely to be subject to close scrutiny, although
high-income taxpayers appeared to behave diﬀerently from those on low
and modest incomes.
• Early studies suggested that there is less taxpayer compliance in audit
classes with higher marginal tax rates. However there is an important
word of caution to note here. In any sample of taxpayers taken at any
particular time those persons facing diﬀerent marginal tax-rates may be-
long to groups that have diﬀerent economic opportunities, or that have
significantly diﬀerent preferences for risk and attitudes towards evasion.
More recent work has been be able to show greater insight on the im-
portant relationship between the marginal tax rate and evasion, separate
from income: while income has only a weak eﬀect, the marginal tax rate
has negative impact.
• Detection is imperfect: variation in detection rates is at least as important
as variations in personal characteristics.
2.2.4 Indirect evidence
As we noted above, microdata on tax evasion is, perhaps understandably, limited
in availability and coverage. So some researchers have attempted to get a handle
on the overall noncompliance problem by an indirect route. What is usually done
is to try to infer something about the amount of underground economic activity
(“black” labour, concealed payments as well as undeclared income) by using
some indirect indicator, including monetary variables or apparent diﬀerences
between income and expenditure at the aggregate level.
Unfortunately many of the more ambitious attempts to obtain indirect evi-
dence so are of dubious value, since they are only sketchily based on economic
theory and oﬀer suﬀer from severe econometric shortcomings. What is needed
is a careful empirical model of the relationship between observables that ap-
propriately takes account of the influence of unobservables in its specification
and that provides a plausible basis for distinguishing between the impact of
noncompliance and other unobservables.9
2.2.5 Laboratory experiments
The questions that either microdata or indirect evidence allow the researcher to
pursue usually concern issues such as the possible role of specific personal or job
9An example of the aggregative approach is Crane and Nourzad (1986) used a synthetic
series of an “adjusted gross income gap” as a measure of tax evasion. Modelling this as
a function of tax rates enforcement parameters, income and the inflation rate they suggest
that aggregate evasion falls with the tax rate, in line with the early cross-section TCMP
evidence. Thomas (1999) provides a good overview of the methodlogical pitfalls in many of
these aggregative approaches.
A good example of appropriate micro-modelling of behavioural relationships is Pissarides
and Weber (1989) who use the UK’s Family Expenditure Survey to model the diﬀerential re-
lationship between expenditure and income for the employed (with very low evasion opportu-
nities) and for the self-employed who clearly have substantial opportunity for noncompliance.
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characteristics as factors predisposing to tax compliance, the impact of changes
in tax rates, the relationship between compliance and the tax-structure. It is
not usually possible to focus clearly on taxpayer motivation, which may be of
immediate concern for those who want to judge the eﬀects of incentives — the
“sticks and carrots” — on compliance. Experimental methods suggest themselves
as a possible way of filling this gap, but it is not often that circumstances
permit experiments with real taxpayers. So it is not surprising that several
economists and psychologists have used laboratory experiments. The results
are not encouraging for the TAG model: early studies concluded that subjects
do not seem to act like gamblers in the tax-compliance setting and it is not
even clear that they act in conformity with the basic economic model of risk-
taking. Furthermore it appears that the structure of taxation is important, over
and above the levels of tax-rates and exemptions. However, the evidence on
the responses to tax-enforcement parameters is broadly in line with what gets
from econometric analysis of the microdata reviewed in section 2.2.3 above: for
example a higher probability of audit is associated with greater compliance,
although it may have its principal impact on whether the chooses to evade at
all rather than on the amount evaded conditional on noncompliant behaviour.10
2.3 What is wrong with the model?
Some aspects of the TAG model appear to be distinctly unsatisfactory. For
example the implication that, as long as the expected rate of return to evasion
is positive, everyone will conceal some income. There are several ways in which
we might seek a reform of the underlying model structure: it is useful to focus
on three areas:
• The nature of taxpayer motivation. The assumption is usually made that
the objective function should be in the form of expected utility. What is
the appropriate characterisation of risk?
• The nature of the economic interaction. Because of its inherently non-
strategic nature some essential features determining compliance and the
possibility of manipulation by the tax-authority may have been assumed
away. Furthermore the atemporal setting arguably leaves out some of the
crucial aspects of the interaction between taxpayer and tax authority —
for example it completely misses the issues associated with tax amnesties.
• The nature of the economic agent. The basic TAG model assumes that
we are dealing with gamblers endowed with exogenously fixed incomes.
While this has been relaxed in some models to include labour supply11
the productive economy is usually ignored. In particular focusing on the
TAG model typically neglects a key feature of tax-noncompliance — the
behaviour of firms. Given that the firm is constrained only by the size of
10The studies by Baldry (1986) and (1987) demonstrated that tax evaders to do not seem
to act like gamblers and discusses the role of the structure of taxation. Cowell (1991) demon-
strates the violations of the basic risk-taking model. Spicer and Thomas (1982) focus on the
role of audit probability. Some (weak) contrary evidence on responses to tax-enforcement
parameters in the laboratory setting is given by Alm et al. (1990).
11 See, for example, Baldry (1979), Cowell (1985) and Pencavel (1979).
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the market and its ability to undercut the costs of competitors the con-
sequences of successful individual successful attempts at noncompliance
may be enormous.
We will deal with each of these issues in sections 3 to 5.
3 What taxpayers want — rethinking taxpayer
motivation
Underlying the TAGmodel is the simple greed assumption that is conventionally
made in economics. It is clear that this may only tell a partial story when it
comes to issues that involve big issues such as the relationship between the
citizens and the state. The question as to what motivates taxpayers deserves to
be addressed. Clearly some people may pay taxes and refrain from evasion out
of civic duty. In reviewing taxpayer motivation we may examine a number of
issues that give arise to distinct modelling issues.
3.1 The expected utility model
The TAG model, rooted in rather conservative economic theory, assumes ratio-
nal individuals with stable preferences who, given specific economic opportu-
nities and probabilities, maximize their expected utility. The expected utility
(EU) paradigm may be good as a device for simplified model-building but it may
miss out important nuances about people’s preferences in the face of uncertainty.
Indeed the use of the EU assumptions to characterise these preferences is
arguably restrictive. It rules out state-dependent utility and hence any feeling
of shame, or intrinsic delight at successful evasion. It also rules out regrets
and misperceptions by the taxpayer of the probabilities of alternative possible
states of the world — i.e. misperceptions about the probability of audit. However,
there is evidence that individuals make systematic mistakes when attempting to
maximize their expected utility. Would relaxing this assumption to encompass
non-EU models — such as rank-dependent utility or prospect theory — result in
a more promising underlying story?
Rank-dependent utility is unlikely to be a fruitful approach in the present
context given the typically uncomplicated nature of the risk involved: the pos-
sible outcomes are usually taken to be the simple pair (“income-if-not-caught”,
“income-if-caught”) rather than some richer structure of possible payoﬀs. How-
ever, prospect theory incorporates a number of features that may be relevant to
the problem of appropriately modelling taxpayer choice, in particular:
• Individuals “edit” information about gambles before they evaluate them
so as to simplify the representation of the prospect with which they are
faced.
• They use a reference point from which to measure outcomes in terms of
changes.
• The value function is defined over gains and losses relative to the reference
point rather than absolute values of wealth or income.
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• In evaluating of gambles individuals assign decision weights diﬀerent from
the actual probabilities.
The first three of these lead to a version of the “framing” phenomenon in
which risk choices are evaluated diﬀerently according to the way in which they
are presented to the decision maker — in particular gains may be evaluated quite
diﬀerently from losses relative to a particular reference point.
Several studies examine tax evasion in the light of prospect theory and sug-
gest support for the framing hypothesis whereby the response to a particular eco-
nomic incentive (stick or carrot) would diﬀer according to the context in which it
was perceived. But direct tests of conformity of behaviour with prospect theory
have been inconclusive.12 It is not clear that prospect theory receives over-
whelming support in comparison with EU, although the framing issue remains
important for the issue of the eﬀectiveness of incentives and sanctions.
3.2 The range of goods
The range of goods in the utility function is also simplified within the speci-
fication of the TAG problem. Individuals are concerned only with their own
private consumption and so of course care nothing for the goods and services
that are produced by the resources raised through the tax system. This issue is
relevant to economies with a small public sector as well as those that supply a
lot of goods publicly. One would expect to see a positive relationship between
marginal tax rates and the overall size of the underground economy if, on aver-
age, public goods were perceived to be under-provided, with the reverse eﬀect
if there is overprovision of public goods.13
3.3 The temporal model
The TAG model ignores time: one can imagine that each year essentially the
same gamble takes place, without there being any “memory” in the system.
Some contributions to the literature have attempted to correct this by allowing
the tax-authority to use information from multiple time periods. Even if the
tax-authority uses just information from the current period for an audit, the
outcome of the audit may be used to trigger retrospective investigation.14 This
12On the general issues of prospect theory see Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Tversky
and Kahneman (1981)and Schepanski and Shearer (1995), and for a review of experimental
evidence on the EU model and other paradigms of individual decision making see Camerer
(1995). Support for the framing hypothesis is found in the studies by Chang et al. (1987),
Robben et al. (1990) and Schepanski and Shearer (1995). King and Sheﬀrin (2002) designed
an investigation to identify whether individual behaviour conforms to the standard results of
prospect theory, given a scenario that incorporates a perception of inequity. Using student
respondents they adopt a questionnaire approach designed to reveal how the individual re-
sponds when filing taxes. The responses to the control questions are consistent with prospect
theory. However the responses to the questions depicting inequity are more consistent with
expected utility theory in that they did not display the phenomenon of “loss aversion” (risk-
taking when faced with losses and risk-averse when face with gains) that is characteristic of
prospect theory.
13Note that this phenomenon is, nonetheless, fully consistent with the well-known “free-
rider” problem associated with public good provision; it follows from the impact of income
levels on risk-taking behaviour associated with noncompliance — see Cowell and Gordon (1988).
14This is the argument in Engel and Hines (1999). See also Greenberg (1984) and Lands-
berger and Meilijson (1982) for a detailed analysis of the role of time in the audit sequence.
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clearly weights the “stick” of the punishment wielded by the tax authority. A
rational taxpayer’s current tax evasion is a decreasing function of evasion in
previous periods: the reason for this is that if the taxpayer is audited and caught
evading this year penalties for earlier noncompliance may be incurred.
3.4 Interdependence
There are a number important of aspects of taxpayer interdependence that can
impact on the overall compliance problem including aspects of trust and the
concept of a “climate of behaviour.” This climate can be represented by an
externality in the individual utility function — people may care about their own
behaviour relative to those of their peers; the “stigma” or non-monetary penalty
associated with discovered evasion may be endogenously determined by the
behaviour of others.15 This consumption externality may be supplemented by
a production externality; the growth in individual noncompliance may facilitate
the development of a kind of infrastructure of noncompliance — finding a corrupt
accountant to for one’s own tax-cheating will lower the search costs of other
potential non-compliers.
The endogeneity of the interdependence within the economic model is cru-
cial. One of the significant contributions of the type of economic model that
incorporates such interdependence is to explain why there may be epidemics of
noncompliance. The maintenance of a culture of compliance is one good example
of where a government or a tax administration may be able to create a “carrot”
or positive incentive for taxpayers to act in their broader social interests rather
than just according to narrow selfishness.
4 Donkeys, mice and ghosts
Are taxpayers donkeys? The stick-and-carrot approach to modelling the inter-
action between taxpayer-tax and authority assumes that the tax authority views
the issue of economic incentives in a fairly simplistic fashion. The reason for
this is the simple nature of the economic interaction in the basic TAG model:
the tax-authority lays down a set of ground rules of the mass of taxpayers;
each taxpayer assumes that the probabilities in the fundamental gamble are
uninfluenced by his or her own actions.
4.1 Strategic models
An alternative view of economic interaction between the two parties sees them as
cat and mouse, or cat and dog. Each party is aware of the other’s motivations
and interests — the taxpayer wants to maximise utility, the tax authority to
maximise net tax revenue — and takes these into account in selecting its own
strategy. The outcome is an equilibrium in which each party makes the best
response to the other’s strategy in the light of the available information.
This type of approach resolves into two basic classes of model according as
whether one assumes that it is reasonable for the tax authority to precommit
15On trust see Scholz and Lubell (1998). The stigma model is attributable to Benjamini
and Maital (1985). Note that it only requires an aggregate level of externality to be generated
by the taxpayers as distinct from the near-neighbour model of Glaeser et al. (1996) in which
the position of other economents is important.
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to an audit strategy — to set the agenda for the interaction.16 Which model
is the more appropriate depends on issues such as the type of institutions and
laws present in the economy and the nature of the information available to the
parties.
4.1.1 Precommitment
In a model characterised by a simplified distribution of income (just “rich”
and “poor” in known proportions) and where the tax authority “moves first”
strategically the optimal policy of the authority is stark. It should audit all low
income reports and ignore all the high income reports. However, under such
circumstances no high-income person would ever dare to report a low income;
so in fact the only people who ever get audited are those who are genuinely
low-income! The statement of the model may seem extreme but it contains an
inner truth about the regressive nature of such carefully tailored audit schemes.
4.1.2 No precommitment
By contrast consider a model where precommitment to such an extreme policy
is not credible. Again there are two income levels, but also the personal char-
acteristics of the population are such that some will always report truthfully,
others would cheat on the tax authority if they get the opportunity and find it
profitable to do so. Let the probability that the tax-authority decides to audit a
particular low-income report be p and the probability of a potentially dishonest
taxpayer not complying be q. Each party takes fully into account the other’s
strategy in this game of noncompliance and investigation. The outcome will
be a Nash equilibrium characterised by a pair (p∗, q∗) representing the “best
response” of each party (the tax-authority, the taxpayer) to the other’s strategy
in this game. Each of these equilibrium values depends on, among other things,
the tax rate t, the penalty surcharge s and the cost of an individual audit. In
general we find that:
• Decreasing the marginal cost of audit — i.e. making the investigation
and enforcement system more eﬃcient — will reduce the probability of
noncompliance q∗; but it will leave the optimal probability of audit p∗
unchanged.
• Increasing the surcharge s will reduce both the optimal probability of
audit and the optimal probability of noncompliance. The first of these is
attributable to the usual marginal deterrent eﬀect of higher punishment;17
the second emerges because the the tax-authority does not need to put in
so much eﬀort to achieve a given result in terms of net revenue raised.
• Increasing the tax rate reduces the probability of noncompliance q∗ and
will either increase or leave unchanged the optimal probability of audit.
16 See Reinganum and Wilde (1985) for the model with precommitment and Graetz
et al. (1986), Reinganum and Wilde (1986) for the no-commitment case. The specific no-
commitment model discussed here is briefly outlined in Appendix A.2.
17A word of caution. This argument about the marginal deterrent eﬀect in this and other
models cannot be pressed too far — see page 18 below.
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It is interesting to note that, despite the very diﬀerent premises of this type
of model, the impact of the key parameters s and t on compliance is in the same
direction as in the TAG model.
4.2 Ghosts
Ghosts are individuals who fail to comply with their income tax filing require-
ments in an extreme form — they “disappear” from the system. From the point
of view of the economic modelling there is an essential diﬀerence between those
who make a zero-income report and those who make no report at all. What
do we know, or what could be known, about ghosts and the way they can be
expected to respond to economic incentives designed by a tax agency?
Unfortunately information about behaviour and characteristics of ghosts is
sparse, although enough is known to suggest that they are quantitatively im-
portant: the US ghost population in 1988 has been estimated to be 7.9 million
(compared with 110 million who filed tax returns); the tax shortfall for the
ghosts is estimated as $11 billion — some 15 percent of the known tax shortfall
of those who filed returns.18 However, ghosts play a role in the overall tax-
enforcement story that may be more important than a snapshot picture of their
numbers may suggest.
4.3 Hybrid model
The reason for this last remark is that typically both ghosts and strategic players
are present in the same population. The margin between the two types of
behaviour may be crucial from the point of view of policy design: an over-
zealous approach to implementation of enforcement in the sector populated by
strategic players may mean that they migrate to the “ghost” sector that is,
in essence non-strategic and where the costs of detection and enforcement are
typically much higher.19
5 Firms
Why consider corporations or businesses separately in economic models of tax
compliance? Some have adopted an essentially pragmatic approach: it has been
argued that to distinguish corporate and personal sectors is an important way
to understand the overall distortionary impact of tax evasion.20 However, this
is distinct from the issue of whether the underlying economic analysis of tax
evasion is, or should be, diﬀerent according to the sector considered.
Let us briefly examine the state of the economics literature on the issue
of compliance and tax enforcement as it relates to the behaviour of firms and
attempting to unpick the key issues that could characterise a specific theory of
compliance by firms. This theoretical approach could then form the basis of
appropriate empirical models for the corporate sector and enable policy makers
18The results come from Erard and Ho (2001) who extend the standard TAG model to
account for non-filers and use a special subset of the TCMP data containing detailed tax and
audit information for both filers and nonfilers of US federal income tax returns.
19 See Cowell and Gordon (1995).
20 See Fullerton and Karayannis (1994).
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to develop a quantitative model for analysing the eﬀectiveness of tax-compliance
regimes.
In principle firms can evade by misreporting or making false declaration
about profits, sales or input use and other costs. Does the assumed market
environment of the firm make a diﬀerence to its compliance behaviour?
5.1 Model
Let us take a simplified model 21 of a firm with constant average and marginal
cost producing a single output subject to tax at a uniform rate. The tax is
enforced in the same way as described on page 2 and so again there is an im-
plied expected rate-of-return to noncompliance r¯. Checking through the formal
specification of this model in Appendix A.3 it can be seen that this could be
reinterpreted as a model where profit is the tax base.
The firm has two types of decision to make:
• The quantity of output.
• The extent to which it conceals output or hides profit.
In analysing the solution to this double problem it is useful to introduce two
new concepts. The first is the expected tax rate on output t¯: this is given by the
nominal tax rate t multiplied by a factor of one minus the proportion of output
concealed times r¯. The expected tax rate is under the control of the individual
firm (through the choice it makes on concealment) as well as the tax authority.
The second concept we need is the average concealment cost per unit of output
g: this will itself be a function of the amount of concealment — the amount of
evasion — undertaken.
Let us assume that the firm chooses the output and level of evasion to max-
imise expected profits. Because the model is so simple expected profits can be
written as
(P −m− g − t¯)× output
where P is price and m is marginal cost and the components g and t¯ (but
no others) depend on the amount of concealment. A number of conclusions
immediately follow:
• If the firm conceals output it will do so up to the point where the marginal
cost of concealment equals the marginal reduction of expected tax rate.
• The firm will always conceal some output if t¯ < t. This is equivalent to
the requirement that the expected rate-of-return r¯ be positive.
• There is a fundamental separability property between the concealment
decision and the output decision. Here the concealment decision is inde-
pendent of the output decision.
21This is based on the standard approach in the literature. The key references are Cremer
and Gahvari (1993) and Virmani (1989) who focus on a competitive industry, Marrelli (1984)
and Marrelli and Martina (1988) dealing with noncompetitive firms that are assumed to be
risk averse and Myles (1995) who assumes risk neutrality. For a detailed treatment see Bayer
et al. (2003).
14
• Output decisions for the competitive firm are determined by a modified
“price = marginal cost” rule.
The solution to the maximisation problem can be used to derive comparative
statics results in the usual way. In the case of the competitive model we then
find:
• Reported sales decrease as the tax rate increases.
• An increase in tax increases the price but by less than the amount of the
tax since some of the tax increase is absorbed in increased evasion.
• An increased probability of detection p or an an increased surcharge s will
raise the proportion of sales declared, expected tax and the market price.
So, as in the TAG model, enhanced deterrence will have the appropriate
eﬀect on evasion; in addition it moves expected taxes in the direction that
we might have anticipated. But, by contrast to the TAG model, we have an
unambiguous prediction of a rise in tax evasion with a rise in the tax rate.
Moreover the results are not special to the competitive model. Under risk-
neutrality the separability property holds and so it is not surprising to find that
basically same conclusions apply to the monopolistic case as those for the case
of perfect competition. The only real diﬀerence in the equilibrium is that “price
= adjusted marginal cost” rule is replaced by a condition involving the elasticity
of demand.
However, the separability issue is potentially more problematic once one
drops the assumption of risk neutrality. This matters both because it clarifies
the factors that determine equilibrium compliance by firms in a variety of market
environments and because it enables us to draw clear-cut conclusions about the
impact of policy parameters.22
5.2 Empirical analysis
Unfortunately the empirical analysis of corporate tax evasion is extremely lim-
ited. In the main it consists of either a compilation of rather obvious results
(e.g. tax evasion depends on the preferences of the person who has the power
over declaration), or of procedures that could be considered as methodologically
weak. The main reasons are:
1. The lack of theoretical models, since theory mainly focused on personal
income tax evasion;
22Wang and Conant (1988) study the expected utility function when a monopolist overstates
production costs in order to reduce taxable profits. The uncertain monopolist’s optimal rate
of output is not aﬀected by either the profit tax or the penalty rate. Yaniv (1995)’s model
of tax evasion covers diﬀerent types of taxes that can be evaded by the firm showing that
the diﬀerent types of taxes do not alter the separability conclusion. Yaniv (1996) extends the
analysis of separability to cases in which both the probability of detection and the penalty
rate vary with the amount of cost overstatement. Lee (1998) shows that the separability
property and the neutrality of profit taxes depend on the audit probability and penalty rate
are formulated— see also Wang (1990).
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2. The lack of corporate income tax compliance microdata;
3. The lack of confidence in microdata on tax compliance and relevance of
measurement error.
However, some evidence is available, again drawn from the TCMP.23 Of
special interest are two main results that have no counterpart in the literature
on personal income tax compliance:
• A firm’s compliance is positively associated with being publicly traded
and with belonging to a highly regulated industry;
• Having low profits relative to the industry median is correlated with higher
corporate tax evasion.
Clearly both of these findings have potentially important implications for
the design of policy.
5.3 An assessment
Let us briefly compare the situation of the personal and the corporate sector
as they are commonly represented within microeconomic analysis. What makes
the simple microeconomic model of the firm in section 5.1 essentially diﬀerent
from the TAG model applied to the individual? Three features stand out: (1)
the nature of the taxpayer, (2) the assumption about risk preferences, (3) the
determinants of responsiveness to economic incentives.
The taxpayer It is reasonable to argue that individuals — and perhaps
even families and households — exist as exogenously given entities; the set of
potential taxpayers could be imagined as exogenously given. This is not the case
with firms: firms are born and dissolved; they merge and change their shape;
they do all this in response to economic incentives. The tax system and its
enforcement mechanism are essential components of those economic incentives
and so we have to have a reasonable model of firm behaviour before we can
say anything intelligible about the impact of tax and enforcement policy. Of
course the contrast is with the household sector is somewhat overstated,24 but
this contrast may contains an important component of the problem.
Risk preferences A major feature of the model of personal noncompli-
ance is the role of risk aversion in the equilibrium. Although several papers in
the “cat-and-mouse” tradition of strategic models assume risk neutrality, rea-
sonable amount of risk aversion is required in the TAG model in order to get
interesting answers. If you had risk neutrality or extremely high risk aversion
you would always end up at corner solution of the equilibrium. By contrast in
23Rice (1992) used a corporate subset of TCMP based on an examination of the tax and
financial records of a stratified random sample of about 30,000 US corporations out of a total
of 1.5 million corporation with assets less than $10 million.
24 In particular one would expect to find a rlationship between the individual personal mo-
tivations of those running firms and firm behaviour: an interesting example of this is Joulfaian
(2000) who finds a positive and significative correlation between managers’ preferences and
firm compliance using US data.
16
modelling firms it is common to assume risk-neutrality: the neutrality assump-
tion is often important the separation result that enables clear predictions to
be established from the theory..
Responsiveness to incentives Following on from the diﬀerence in con-
ventional assumption about risk preference is the question of what drives the
responsiveness (or lack of it) of the taxpayer to sticks and carrots. In the case
of personal taxpayers diﬀerences in risk preference are one important way of
characterising the diﬀerential; responsiveness of diﬀerent groups to penalties or
the probability of detection. In the case of the firm modelled in section 5.1
it is quite diﬀerent. The equilibrium is determined by a first-order condition
involving the marginal concealment cost and the rate-of-return to tax evasion
— see equation (27). It is this essential diﬀerence in the model that gives rise,
amongst other things, to the diﬀerent relationship between compliance and the
tax rate in the models of the personal and the corporate sector.
Understanding the nature and the determinants of the cost-of-concealment
function g is essential to understanding what is going on in firms’ noncompliance
and in to understanding the economic incentives that may usefully be applied
to a tax-enforcement agency. The academic literature on this point is rather
sparse, but one could conjecture that this will depend on such things as the
following:
• The nature of the product. The output or sale of highly visible physical
goods is going to be harder to conceal than some services, for example.
Just as the opportunities for evasion in the personal sector diﬀer strongly
across occupational categories (employment versus self employment), so
also one would expect to find systematic diﬀerences across industry cate-
gories.
• The size and organisational structure of the firm. Firms with a more
complex organisation are likely to have higher concealment costs: the
more people you bring into the plot the greater the security problem you
face and the greater the risk of discovery.
• The role of reputation. Clearly firms for which a respected brand name
is considered as an assurance of quality have more to lose in the case of
exposure of illegal activity and therefore higher concealment costs.
• The degree of concentration of the industry. There are two counteracting
eﬀects. Firstly, an industry with a large number of similar firms may be
easier to police by an external agency: those deviating from the norm
in terms of reporting will be easier to spot; this would lead to higher
concealment costs for each firm. On the other hand the presence of a large
number of similar type firms will encourage the spread of concealment
technology appropriate to a particular type of firm.
6 Guidance for policy-makers
Unsurprisingly, the appropriate guidance for policy-makers depends on the spe-
cific model in which we decide to put our trust. To consider alternative models
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is not just a preoccupation with theoretical nicety but can help us draw useful
policy lessons.
6.1 The TAG model
If noncompliant taxpayers are, in economic terms, indistinguishable from gam-
blers then they should be responsive to the same kind of economic incentives
as are gamblers. There may be enough information about individual types a to
tailor an audit policy that is conditioned on personal characteristics — of course
this would have to use proxies for the true values of the components of a which
are unobservable, but reasonable proxies may well be available. Obviously this
approach rests on the assumptions that the TAG model is appropriate, that
individuals’ perceptions of the gambles involved are accurate and that they are
rationally pursuing a policy of ex-ante utility maximisation. But, as we have
seen, the evidence on this is not particularly convincing.
However, let us take the TAG model at face value for a moment: what
recommendations would it suggest? Suppose the objective of the tax authority
is simply to raise revenue then intuition would suggest (and formal analysis
confirms — see Appendix A.1.2) that enforcement should be intensified until the
probability of audit satisfies:
Marginal Revenue Raised = Marginal Resource Cost
where the item on the left-hand side includes both the direct revenue (tax uncov-
ered plus surcharge) and the indirect revenue yielded by the eﬀect on compliance
of a higher audit probability. Allowing for the problem that the marginal rev-
enue computation relies on taxpayer perceptions of probabilities that may be
inappropriate the above condition seems to have a common-sense appeal; more-
over this marginalist rule can be adapted and extended to other versions of the
objective function.
There is a snag, though: this is a partial result that focuses on just the
audit probability as a policy variable. If we allow the parameter s to be chosen
too then it appears as though the tax-authority can do better — that is to
say it can always achieve its objective at lower resource cost by raising s and
cutting p (as long as p remains positive, albeit very small). Indeed, given this
greater flexibility, there is an obvious method of guaranteeing total compliance
— choosing s and p to ensure that the expected rate of return to compliance is
not positive (Cf proposition 1 in section 2.2.1). If we press the simple logic of
the TAG approach then it is clear that the tax authority should save resources
by using a (very) “big-stick” version of deterrence.25
But uncritical application of the “big stick” approach to forcing compliance
can lead to ridiculous outcomes. Let us not assume that such ridiculous out-
comes would automatically be prevented by the common sense of legislators
or administrators: one could perhaps reach the extraordinary situation of 18th
Century London, described by Charles Dickens:
“But indeed, at that time, putting to death was much in vogue
with all trades and professions and not least of all with Tellson’s
25On the welfare consequences of the simple TAG approach see Cowell (1989), Kolm (1973).
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[Bank]. Death is Nature’s remedy for all things and why not Leg-
islation’s? Accordingly the forger was put to Death; the utterer of
a bad note was put to Death; the unlawful opener of a letter was
put to Death; the purloiner of forty shillings and sixpence was put
to Death; the holder of a horse at Tellson’s door, who made oﬀ with
it, was put to Death; the coiner of a bad shilling was put to Death;
... not that it did the least good in the way of prevention — it might
almost have been worth remarking that the fact was almost exactly
the reverse — but it cleared oﬀ (as to this world) the trouble of each
particular case and left nothing else connected with it to be looked
after.” — A Tale of Two Cities, Book II, Chapter 1.
Of course it is a cheap shot to pillory the outcome of simplified economic
model as ridiculous. What is more useful is to identify the economic reasons why
the high-s-low-p outcome is ridiculous and, perhaps, the way a more reasonable
policy recommendation might be derived. We will do this under four headings.
Unreasonableness At a first glance the obvious objection to the big-stick
approach is that it is just not reasonable. Do we really want to see extreme
penalties for perhaps minor cases of infringement of tax law? At the very least
legislators and those implementing the law need to have a sense of proportion
as to what is appropriate in the context of taxation relative to, say, fraud and
theft elsewhere in society.
Ineﬀectiveness Appeals to reasonableness may seem like the lament of
a woolly-minded reformer who refuses to accept economic logic. However the
outcome of this application of the TAG model also defies economic logic in that
it ignores the issue of appropriately structured incentives in punishment. If, for
a terrible moment, we imagine huge penalties for tax noncompliance we might
well also comment “not that it did the least good in the way of prevention.”
Taxpayers would, with impeccable economic logic, conclude that they might as
well be hung for a sheep as for a lamb.
Inequity Ex-post inequities are almost bound to occur but it should be
the job of a sensible tax administration to make sure that the consequences
are not grotesquely magnified. An obvious source of potential inequity in this
case are errors by taxpayers and by auditors. Although the standard model
assumes that noncompliance is a result of optimisation amoral by taxpayers
who desire the public benefits of the state without paying the private cost a
substantial amount of noncompliance could be attributable to mistakes or the
outcome of inertia or lazy habits. A more sensible approach to the normative
analysis of compliance is to allow that errors are entirely possible — indeed this
seems reasonable in the light of the evidence from the psychological literature.
Taxpayers can be encouraged by appropriate incentives to take care in reporting,
while the design and implementation of the penalty structure can distinguish
between minor infractions and serious violations, even if this were to be at the
apparent cost of some expected revenue.26
26On the role of intertia see Smith and Kinsey (1987). Boadway and Sato (2000) examine
the eﬀects of unintentional errors on the design of tax enforcement and tax policy. Maximal
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Misspecification It is possible that, although the TAG model has the
advantage of conformity with mainstream economic analysis, and although it
may be useful as a useful starting point for discussion amongst those raised in
a neoclassical tradition of applied welfare economics, it is just taking us in the
wrong direction because it is built of the wrong components. Let us consider
what might be learned from some of the alternatives that have been mentioned
in previous sections.
6.2 Modified motivation
The review of the representation of taxpayer preferences in section 3 is not just
a matter of theoretical nicety. A better understanding of how individuals reach
decisions under uncertainty can help in the eﬀective design or modification of a
policy to enhance tax compliance.
Non EU models of risk It is clear that one of the main reasons for the
failure of TAG is a popular misperception of the probability of audit. The use
of decision weights that diﬀer from the actual audit probabilities may give the
tax authority an opportunity to induce greater compliance by exploiting this
misperception. It is clearly in its interest that taxpayers act as though they
overestimate the chance that they will be caught.
However the non-EU risk model also suggests that there could be fruitful
and low-cost possibilities for administrative innovation. If we take the framing
phenomenon seriously there may be considerable scope for imaginative redesign
of conditional payments associated with tax-enforcement. Even though two dif-
ferent payment schemes may be formally equivalent in terms of the individual’s
conditional budget constraint (1) they may be viewed quite diﬀerently by the
person making the choice under uncertainty. For example should the tax author-
ity consider prizes for promptness instead of penalties for late payments? One
might go further and suggest that bonuses for an excellent compliance record
may be more eﬀective in some cases than surcharges for under-reporting.
Finally, since there is some evidence that, contrary to the TAG assumptions,
taxpayer perceptions are important, it is clear that the structure of taxation as
well as the magnitude of the incentives should be taken into account in good
policy design.
Interaction The interaction models of section 3.4 pick up on an important
externality present in the economic problem of compliance. The clear message
of the “epidemic” model is that the impact of a modification in tax-enforcement
policy should not be judged just in terms of its marginal impact on the compli-
ance of a representative taxpayer. The tax authority can also have an important
role to play — if not a duty — in fostering a climate of compliance.
Unfortunately the message is mainly a negative one: it is probably much eas-
ier to lose the right climate through careless implementation than to build up
the right group eﬀects and socially responsible behaviour from scratch. How-
ever, there are some positive steps that should be considered in response to
sanctions are not applied, unlike the Dickensian model. Although intentional evasion can be
deterred by introducing “carrots” for honest reporting, innocent tax evaders may be penalised
whether they have unintentionally evaded or have been mistakenly convicted.
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this externality. Insofar as the externality is generated by an infrastructure of
noncompliance it makes sense to regulate the activities and institutions associ-
ated with this infrastructure. Other forms of regulation in the economy may be
crucial for eﬀective regulation of tax compliance.
6.3 Strategic models and hybrids
The strategic or “cat-and-mouse” type of model is informative for the design of
enforcement strategy in a reporting context. However it assumes a well-defined
and rather limited set of possible outcomes and a highly simplified distribution
of unknowns (for example, in the implementable versions of such models there
is usually a very simple representation of the income distribution from which
the taxpayer is assumed to be drawn). This type of model of the compliance
problem seems to be more appropriate to the one-on-one negotiation that may
take place between the tax authority and large individual taxpayers, personal
or corporate rather than to control of the masses.
Even in the context where the simple cat—and-mouse model is applicable
it can lead to some uncomfortable conclusions. Typically the kind of tailored
policy that emerges from the model generates a regressive application of the
tax law — reports from the poor are audited much more intensively than those
from the rich, but for good economic reasons. These good economic reasons
may not be suﬃcient to recommend the active pursuit of a strategy that could
be perceived as socially divisive.
Furthermore, if one takes on board the lesson of the hybrid model, a par-
ticularly diﬃcult economic problem arises from the possibility of spillover. This
spillover is an induced migration from the reporting sector that permits sophis-
ticated strategic interaction to a genuine “underground economy” where time-
consuming hunting of noncompliant citizens (ghosts) would have to be carried
out. Over-zealous enforcement in the areas with relatively low-cost information
may exacerbate the problems in high-cost areas (where the ghosts are).
6.4 The firm
Using the kind of structure outlined in section 5.1 optimal tax-enforcement
rules for the firm-noncompliance can be derived;27 but the more interesting
question is the way to use the model to provide working guidelines for those who
design tax-compliance schemes. Here the nature of concealment costs and their
relationship to firms’ characteristics seem to be crucial. As we have noted this
will determine the responsiveness to incentives of all firms for which the expected
rate of return to noncompliance is positive. It suggests that the right approach
to the empirical modelling of compliance and to the practical enforcement of
tax payments by corporations should be piecemeal. The appropriate piecemeal
approach will depend on the type of market in which the firm operates, the
nature of its products and the size of the firm itself.
It is useful to consider a number of points arising from the analysis of the
personal sector that can be expected to have an important part to play in tax-
enforcement policy toward firms.
27See the derivations in Cremer and Gahvari (1993) and Etro (1998)
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• The time component is, possibly, more important for firms than for indi-
viduals. We can expect reputation to be relevant for corporate tax evasion
and for the eﬀectiveness of enforcement mechanisms.
• As with individuals, audit data on firms are bound to be limited in
that they have relatively little to say on “ghosts.” For many developed
economies an important contribution to the understanding of firms’ non-
compliance is a suitable model of the underground economy.
• Sometimes practical economic enquiry has to proceed by stealth, as in the
indirect method to acquiring evidence of noncompliance that was consid-
ered in relation to personal incomes (see page 7). An important role for a
tax authority is to identify observables that are likely to be correlated with
profit (as consumption is with income) and that firms have an incentive
to reveal more truthfully.
• This suggests that, as with the control of the infrastructure of personal
noncompliance, an appropriate compliance policy will go hand-in-hand
with eﬀective regulation of industry.
7 A final word
Although the standard economic model of the stick-and-carrot approach to tax
enforcement is flawed in many ways, it is a useful starting point for under-
standing the mechanics of individual decision-making. But it can be seriously
misleading as a guide to policy advice. However, this should not make one scep-
tical of the contribution that theory can make to tax administration: careful
microeconomic analysis of the role of incentives can tell us quite a lot. We may
just have to be a little more selective about our modelling.
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A Mathematical Appendix
This appendix presents the core elements of the theoretical models that underlie
some of the principal assertions in the main text.
A.1 The TAG model
Given the model in Axioms 1-4 the first-order condition for maximising (2) with
respect to e is given by
E (ruac (c)) ≤ 0 if e∗ = 0 (5)
E (ruac (c)) ≥ 0 if e∗ = y (6)
E (ruac (c)) = 0 otherwise. (7)
where uac (c) denotes the first derivative of u
a and E denotes the expectations
operator. Inequalities (5) and (6) represent, respectively, the cases where the
person reports truthfully (conceals no income) and where the person conceals
everything. Equation (7) gives the case where the person conceals just a part
of his income from the authorities. first-order conditions (5)-(7) can be solved
to yield the taxpayer-response function:
e∗ = e(τ , y, a) (8)
where τ := (p, s, t) is the collection of tax-and-enforcement parameters.
A.1.1 Comparative statics
If the person is risk-averse and at an interior equilibrium then (7) characterises
the optimum and diﬀerentiation can be used to obtain the way e changes in
response to policy parameters. For example, diﬀerentiating (7) with respect to
p and using (1)we get
E ¡r2uacc(c)¢ ∂e(τ , y, a)∂p − uac (c0)− suac (c00) = 0 (9)
The expectation term on the left-hand side must be negative, in view of the
concavity of ua and so
∂e(τ , y, a)
∂p
=
uac (c
0) + suac (c
00)
E (r2uacc(c))
< 0 (10)
Likewise we can derive
∂e(τ , y, a)
∂s
< 0 (11)
and, if axiom 5 holds and s is a constant independent of t and y:
∂e(τ , y, a)
∂t
< 0 (12)
Note that (12) holds if the penalty is proportional to the tax evaded (as in our
interpretation of the TAG model) rather than to the income concealed (Yitzhaki
1974).
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A.1.2 The aggregate
If the numbers of taxpayers is eﬀectively infinite and the distribution of indi-
viduals in the community by (y, a)-type is given by a continuous distribution
function F (y, a) then aggregate income is Y :=
R
y dF (y, a) (the tax base),
aggregate evasion is
E :=
Z
e(τ , y, a) dF (y, a) (13)
and revenue raised is
R := tY − rEt− Φ(p) , (14)
where rEt is the expected aggregate loss through tax evasion and Φ(p) is the
dollar cost to the government of enforcing the probability of detection p every-
where.
We can use this to derive a rule for public policy. Diﬀerentiating (14) with
respect to p we find
∂R
∂p
= −
∂
¡
rE
¢
∂p
t− ∂Φ(p)
∂p
. (15)
So, if the objective were simply to maximise revenue R, setting (15) to zero
would yield:
[1 + s] et| {z }
direct eﬀect
−r¯t ∂e
∂p| {z }
indirect eﬀect
=
∂Φ(p)
∂p
(16)
A.2 Cat and mouse
Consider a world in which there are exactly two levels of income y0 and y0 +
∆y and three groups of taxpayers with characteristics known to be as in the
following table:
Group Income Personal attribute proportion of population
0 y0 _ f0
1 y0 +∆y always honest f1
2 y0 +∆y potentially dishonest f2
Consider first the taxpayers’ position. The behaviour of those in groups 0
and 1 segments is fixed; and those in the group 2 get expected utility
pua ([1− t] y0 + [1− t− st]∆y) + [1− p]ua ([1− t] y0 +∆y) (17)
if they cheat and
ua ([1− t] [y0 +∆y]) (18)
if they do not, where p is the assumed probability that a low-income report will
be audited. The value of p that equates (17) and (18) is given by
p∗ :=
ua ([1− t] y0 +∆y)− ua ([1− t] [y0 +∆y])
ua ([1− t] y0 +∆y)− ua ([1− t] y0 + [1− t− st]∆y)
(19)
If the person were risk-neutral then (19) becomes p∗ = 11+s . Let q be the
proportion of group 2 who cheat on taxes: if they believe that p < p∗ then all
will cheat (q = 1); if p > p∗ then none will cheat (q = 0).
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Now consider the tax authority. It knows that group 0 has to report y0, that
the group-1 people feel bound to report y0 +∆y and that each person in group
2 could report low (y0) or high (y0 + ∆y); it assumes that a proportion q of
this group will report low. If the authority aims to maximise net revenue and
audits a proportion p of the low-income reports then the probability of catching
an evader is
f2q
f0 + f2q
p.
So, if the cost of an individual audit is ϕ, the expected net revenue from the
policy is
[f1 + [1− q] f2] t∆y +
f2q
f0 + f2q
p[1 + s]t∆y − ϕp (20)
which may be rewritten as
const+ p
ϕf0
f0 + f2q
·
q
q∗
− 1
¸
(21)
where
q∗ :=
ϕf0
f2[1 + s]t∆y − ϕ
(22)
From (21) If q > q∗ expected net revenue increases everywhere with p, in which
case the authority would investigate all low-income reports (p = 1); if q < q∗
then expected revenue decreases with p and it will choose p = 0.
The Nash equilibrium is given by the point where the beliefs of the tax
authority and taxpayers are consistent. This is where p = p∗ and q = q∗. To
see how this equilibrium is aﬀected by public policy we just need to diﬀerentiate
(19) and (22) with respect to the parameters ϕ, s, t. Doing so we get:
∂p∗
∂ϕ
= 0,
∂q∗
∂ϕ
> 0 (23)
∂p∗
∂t
≥ 0, ∂q
∗
∂t
< 0 (24)
∂p∗
∂s
< 0,
∂q∗
∂s
< 0. (25)
A.3 The firm
The simplified model uses the following assumptions
• Proportional cost function: average and marginal cost are a constant m.
• Proportional tax : Output x is taxed uniformly at rate t
• Determinate demand : The firm faces a demand function x(P ) or, equiv-
alently, can command a known price P = P (x) for its product, where
P (·) is the inverse demand function. This includes as a special case the
situation of perfect competition where P = constant.
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• Costly concealment : A proportion β of sales are concealed by the firm —
i.e. a proportion 1− β of sales are declared to the tax authority — where
0 ≤ β ≤ 1. The unit cost of concealing is given by G(β) where G(·) is an
increasing convex function.
• Fixed detection probability. The probability of discovery and by the tax
authority and subsequent conviction is fixed at a level p.
• Fixed proportional penalty. The penalty rate on evaded tax is s.
Hence the expected tax rate per unit of output is
t¯ := [1− β + βp[1 + s]] t
= [1− βr¯] t
where r¯ := 1− p− ps, as before. Expected profits are

P −m− βG(β)−

[1− p] [1− β] t| {z }
“not caught”
+ p [1 + sβ] t| {z }
“caught”



 x(P )
= [P −m− g(β)− t¯] x(P ) (26)
where g(β) := βG(β) is the average concealment costs per unit of output. For
any given output level x > 0 (26) implies that the firm chooses β to minimise
concealment costs (as a proportion of total output) plus the expected tax rate:
g(β) + t¯
The first-order condition for a maximum is
dg(β)
dβ
+
∂t¯
∂β
= 0
which simplifies to
dg(β)
dβ
= [1− p [1 + s]] t (27)
=
t− t¯
β
(28)
From (27) a necessary condition for an interior solution for β is that
1− p[1 + s] > 0 (29)
or, equivalently,
t¯ < t for 0 < β ≤ 1
Note that (29) is exactly the same as the requirement that the expected rate of
return to evasion be positive in the simple TAG model — see page 3. If (29) is
violated then clearly no evasion issue will arise and the firm will report honestly.
Market equilibrium for a competitive firm occurs at
P = m+ g + t¯
implying that expected profits are zero; actual profits are positive if the firm is
not audited, negative if audited.
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A.3.1 Comparative statics
Diﬀerentiating (27) with respect to t we find
d2g(β)
dβ2
∂β
∂t
= [1− p [1 + s]]
so
∂β
∂t
> 0
Clearly the same method give us
∂β
∂p
< 0,
∂β
∂s
< 0
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